THE STANDARD OF SUSPENSION OF THE NORMATIVE ACT (ACCORDING TO THE PRACTICE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF GEORGIA)
Abstract
The standard according to which the Constitutional Court of Georgia suspends or does not suspend a normative act has important significance for the issues discussed in this paper. The differences between the standard prescribed under the Article 25 paragraph 5 of the organic law “On Constitutional Court of Georgia”, and the normative description that existed before and after June 3 of 2016 is also interesting in this regard. Prior to the change, the suspension of a normative act was possible if “the Constitutional Court of Georgia considered that the normative act may result in irreversible outcomes for one of the parties.” After the 2016 reform, the record was changed as follows: “In a case when the Constitutional Court of Georgia considers that the normative act may result in irreversible outcomes for one of the parties, the issue is transferred to the Plenum of the Constitutional Court for discussion, which may suspend the disputed act or respective part thereof until the final decision on the matter will be reached or for a shorter period by the decision of the majority of the composition of the plenum at the distribution session.” Based on this clause, it seems that the legislator transformed the standard of irreversible damage to the standard of reassigning the question of the suspension of a normative act to the plenum, and the issue of suspending a normative act by the plenum was left without legislative standard.
In relation to the suspension of a normative act, the practice of the Constitutional Court of Georgia hasusually been todetermine what the question is, whether there is a threat of irreversible damage1 and in what conditions the right of others (third parties) are being placed.2 Therefore, we will touch upon the practice of the Constitutional Court of Georgia, regarding what constitutes irreversible damage and what it takes into consideration when determining the interests of third parties. We will also touch upon the issue of the possibility to restitute the right, as far as based on the existence of such condition the Court may refrain from suspending disputed normative act.
