SECULARISM: FRAMEWORK OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND CHURCH

Abstract

Religion with its natural condition is “in competition” with other religions, exclusive towards them, which is a part of implementation of its function – religious doctrine. Therefore, direct association of the state with one of the religion excludes the protection of freedom of religion and guarantees for the prohibition of discrimination between religions. The primary function of the state in contrast with the exclusive nature of religion is to create inclusive space for citizens. Apart from these, both, the state and the church impose obligations on their members/citizens, between which a conflict might arise.

Because of the natural interdependence, consensus is reached on the necessity of separation of the state from the religion. Such separation is characterized by the concept of secularism.

Secularism is an integral part of a democractic state and the rule of law as it represents an expression of collective conscientious objection of people against association of the state with any religion and therefore it is one of the means of exercising people’s sovereignty. Religion might also be viewed as a social construction and accordingly, secularism conditioned by it, though because of the stable grounds of the social construction in the society, this does not cause a substantive change and in practice, the principles of democratic, legal and secular state have equal and complementary nature.

Despite consensus on the necessity of secularism, boundaries between the state and the church differ according to countries. Models existing in democratic and legal states might be divided into three categories: strict separation, neutrality and accommodation models. According to the model of strict separation, state and church should maximally be distanced from each other. According to the model of neutrality, state should be neutral toward religious institutions and confer no advantage upon any of them. Accommodation model considers that religion has an important role in public life and partly encourages development of religious institutions, though within the framework of this model, coercion to participate/support or discrimination of religious organizations by the state are also excluded.

Existence of different forms of secularism is caused by the different historical backgrounds of the concept’s establishment in a specific place as well as its partly ambiguous content capable of being interpreted in different ways. When the concepts can be interpreted arbitrarily, reference only to the concept and giving it a determinant importance, eliminates the possibility of considering opposite argument as well as a rational discussion. Even hostile politics of the Soviet Union against the church might be justified by the formal argument of secularism, though obviously a number of aspects of this politics, such as confiscating religious buildings from the religious organizations was not an act characteristic to the inclusive state, as it was associated with one of the ideologies – atheism and determined by it.

Thus, in parallel with avoiding a close association when separating the state and church, there is a risk of transformation of their interrelation into the other radical form – repressive policy. Therefore, in order to develop an acceptable form of separation between the state and the church it is necessary that the state found the right balance between avoiding association and repressive politics. In case of such balanced secularism, we will not have the relationship which is based on the concept as a specific ideology, formal separation between the state and church, but which uses the concept, as a specific logical framework, as a ground. In order to begin rethinking secularism as a means of achieving a goal, the theory of “Public Reason” of John Rawls, according to which religious motives are fully acceptable, if they can be “translated” on the grounds acceptable for all, serves a good basis.

The present paper serves development of a logical definition of the concept of secularism acceptable for both stakeholders and than an illustration that the restriction of any right should serve not the secularism itself, but the right understanding of the goal to be achieved through it and serve that goal itself.

The logical framework of secularism is to guarantee the possibility for the state and the church to exercise their functions. As already mentioned, function of the religious organization is to exercise confessional goals determined by the doctrine while the state is an instrument to ensure coexis- tence of people with recognition and protection of human rights (including the security guarantees).

The present work paper argues that discussing secularism in view of the functions exercised by the state and the church displays the form of secularism acceptable for both stakeholders. Based on the analyses of separate decisions, the paper offers specific examples when it is necessary to invoke an argument of secularism to maintain autonomous space for existence of the state and the church.

The state violates a logical framework of secularism when it obstructs the church to implement its doctrine or/and evaluates, delegitimizes the doctrine/religion. Such self-restraint of the state is limited by the state’s obligation to be neutral towards any doctrine, ideology in terms of prohibition of discrimination and positive obligation to protect other rights. The margin of self-restraint also lies with the state’s authority to obstruct the church to come out from its natural condition and privatize public space.

For its part, decisions made by the religious organizations about exclusion of its members from its community because of the differences between their views, is left beyond prohibition of discrimination and the states’ obligation to protect human rights, as the motive of religious organizations to be associated with their doctrinal theses is a part of their function and is justified.

Precondition for a reasonable deliberation of these issues is an exsitance of preliminary agreement that while exercising the national sovereignty and exercising the secularism as well as ensuring freedom of religion and prohibition of discrimination, the state is free from any ideology, does not support rejection of the religion by getting close to atheism, but is inherently in a different position and has the obligation to ensure “safe pluralism”. While performing this obligation the state’s attitude toward religions should be based not on the preliminary confidence but the formula of equal indifference, which will leave an autonomous space necessary for their functioning.

According to the deliberation above, any restriction behind the protection of the concept of secularism should be based not on the autonomous definition of any legal system, but on the goal of the concept of “secularism”, protection of the balance between the functions of the state and the church. Thus, “secularism” should not be perceived as a goal, but an instrument/means to reach the goal. This resembles the principle of separation of powers between the state’s branches assimilarly there are various attitudes toward it on the national level, and the European Court of Human Rights does not legitimize or reject any of the specific models while deliberating this issue, but speaks about the practicability of effective protection of human rights by means of such division of powers. Alike, this principle is not a goal, bat a means of reaching the goal.

The present paper deliberates secularism as a logical framework in sequential components. With ნthis regard, case analysis does not aim at providing a comprehensive and sequential description of one of the legal systems, but at reviewing different aspects of relationship between state and church in the context of the cases and attempts to put an interrelation between the state and church, balance between their function in the one logical, sequential line.

The first chapter deliberates the place of freedom of religion among human rights and its relation to the principle of secularism. The second chapter explains that separate protection of the freedom of religion does not automatically give preference to the followers of a religion and does not result in differentiation between the insult of religious and other feelings.

The third chapter reviews definitions offered by different legal systems. The fourth and fifth chapters specify that secular state does not mean disappearance of the state from the public space, an aim to separate from church or ignoring religious motives when developing state policy by assuming that religious motives cannot be transformed into a public goal.

The next two chapters relate to the scope of autonomy of religious community and its individual members and borders set at the non-interference by the state in it, namely drawn at the protection from privatization of the public space, human rights and equality.

Introduction of the present paper outlines the main theses for future deliberation and the conclusion sums up opinions developed based on the analyses of cases relating to different aspects of the relationship between the state and the church.