CONSTITUTIONAL COURT JUDGES AS LEGAL ELITES IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES: COMPARATIVE EXPERIENCES OF GEORGIA AND RUSSIA

Abstract

The role of apex (constitutional) courts in modern legal systems has traditionally been understood through their function as guardians of higher law and as instrumental institutions in democratic transitions. These courts, whether specialized or diffuse, have amassed significant powers, often on par with political branches, leading to their description as chief institutions of “juristocracy”.

However, when examining these institutions within illiberal and authoritarian regimes, their record is far more complex and contradictory. In such contexts, the very courts designed to expose and prevent legal circumvention become actively involved in its perpetration and constitutional sanctioning. This involvement is critical for illiberal regimes, which constitutionalize a system of legal cheating. As these regimes transition toward more entrenched authoritarianism, the paradigm of mere cheating is no longer sufficient. Justification of the regime’s official ideology and active legitimization of its measures become routine, and apex courts are central to this evolution.