CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN GEORGIA: POLITICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS
Abstract
Having reemerged in the late 20th century (after its brief existence as the Democratic Republic of Georgia during 1918-1921), the Georgian state has developed quite an “original” habit in the manner it made permanent and virtually unrestrained modifications to its supreme law, the Constitution. It is obvious that since its adoption on 24 August 1994, the Constitution of Georgia has been altered with amendments and addenda, one after the other, and the current version of the supreme law has largely nothing in common with and is no longer identical to its original text even though it has been operational for 17 years now.
This paper will discuss key political and legal aspects of constitutional changes in Georgia and will analyze and highlight those factors which had a major influence on the essence and content of changes.
If we perceive constitutionalism as a political and legal theory establishing the constitutional order, it will be appropriate and legitimate to consider not only legal but also political aspects of constitutional changes. Because, a political system, as a phenomenon, is a sort of creative framework which forms and constructs a legal characteristic. Without studying it, discussing the real essence of constitutional changes makes no sense, especially in such an environment in which the newly emerged Georgian state had to take its first steps.
According to a common opinion, a constitution is just as much a legal act as a political one since the state and government are those main elements which combine all attributes of a political system. In this very context and from the perspective of constitutionalism, we will review main amendments introduced to the Constitution of Georgia to date (i.e. amendments and addenda made in 1999, 2004 and 2010). We will try to get to the depth of the problem although this would require a sort of interdisciplinary research which, at this stage, definitely exceeds our possibilities. This paper is an attempt to view and perceive an issue raised from a theoretical-doctrinal standpoint. If this paper achieves this objective that will be rewarding for the author indeed.
At the end of introduction, we should note that if we consider the phenomenon of “the constitution of fear” formulated by Andras Sajo, a Hungarian professor and renowned theoretician and researcher of constitutional law, we will understand that it is mainly a political fear which largely affects the constitutional climate and the landscape of a state, especially states in transition, which have inherited undeveloped political and legal systems and institutions.
