THE ESSENCE OF THE ENTITLING NORM IN THE CONTEXT OF THE TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY AND THE DOGMATIC PECULIARITIES RELATED TO ITS CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the nature of the entitling norm with respect to the fundamental constitutional principles and the well-established concepts of normative philosophy regarding positive and negative liberty as well as to consider its relevance with the projection of the government’s power, and to determine its constitutional and legal features.

This paper affirms the statement, that in case the norm is in substantial connection with the realization of civil and political rights, the core of which is the negative liberty, notwithstanding its formally entitling nature, cannot be considered as entitling, from a dogmatic perspective. The paper criticizes the practice of the Constitutional Court of Georgia and identifies logical, as well as substantive cases of inconsistency in judicial reasonings